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The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower
relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the
context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of
a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility
in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which
is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive
compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of
adaptive risk behavior proﬁles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic
strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.
Keywords: Dynamic stochastic Stackelberg game, optimal path, closed-loop control,
endogenous risk-aversion, adaptive risk management, optimal risk-sharing.
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1. Introduction
Many economic problems are characterized by the presence of both strategic behavior and
asymmetric information. Stackelberg (or leader-f o l l o w e r )g a m e sa r e ,i nt h i ss e n s e ,u s e f u lt o o l s
for studying dynamic behavior in equilibrium settings in which some player is dominant.
The leader is supposed to know the objective function of the follower while this last one
knows the control strategy of the ﬁrst. The optimal strategy of the follower depends on the
strategy selected by the leader. The objective function of the leader may depend not only on
his own decisions but also on the follower’s.
The leader is able to make his decisions by estimating the follower’s rational reactions,
assuming that he behaves in such a way that he optimizes his objective function given the
leader’s actions.
The distribution of information among the players plays a crucial role in determining their
actions and leads to discontinuities in their behavior. In general, the players diﬀer in their
information systems and beliefs.
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1This asymmetry of information between the leader (the uninformed party but the game
form designer) and the follower (the informed party detaining some private information) as
well as the insuﬃcient knowledge of the leader is a source of adverse selection.
Optimal risk-sharing between two parties has ﬁrst been analyzed by Borch (1962) in the
context of a static reinsurance contracting problem. Understanding the extent of risk-sharing is
important for assessing the performance of the follower as well as the eﬃciency of the leader’s
incentive policy. It is also important to the proper modelling of the economy. When both
contracting parties are risk-averse, it is optimal for them to share risk.
In the real world, there generally exist conﬂicts between follower’s eﬃciency and eﬃciency
in risk-sharing. It is useful to distinguish between risk-sharing and incentives. The private
information can be acquired before the signature of the contract or rather after the contract
has been signed. In other words, the contract between both sides must rather be settled before
the state of nature is known. Risk-sharing is thus an objective which must be solved before the
signature of the contract, while allocative eﬃciency becomes the only concern of the parties
ex-post. This point of view, speciﬁc to the traditional approach, is not totally justiﬁed when
considering dynamic interactions in highly ﬂuctuating environments.
The leader-follower problem can be viewed as a problem in economizing on information.
This situation can generate a diﬀerent qualitative behavior for the players. The leader’s objec-
tive is to design a contract mechanism consistent with incentive-compatibility and individual
rationality-constraints (the contract must produce truthful revelation of the follower’s type,
and the follower must ﬁnd it proﬁtable to accept the contract). Its role is to inﬂuence the
allocation of ex-ante risks optimally. There is a complex trade-oﬀ between hidden information,
moral hazard and risk-sharing.
For constructing such a mechanism, the leader needs very precise knowledge about the
follower’s preferences and the technology he controls. The incentive mechanism is generally
subjected to inescapable informational constraints. This is sensitive to the description of the
environment and the size of informational asymmetries.
Correct incentives are necessary to share information and act appropiately. These will
typically be provided at each period of time. It is important to note that the leader does not
absolutely incur the information acquisition cost in any period of the contract. This may be
quite costly. Information asymmetry and costly acquisition of information impose restrictions
on the leader’s behavior.
Suppose that both players use a closed-loop strategy, that is, they set their control vectors
as functions of the history of the state vector from the start of the game to the moment of
decision. Although past behavior may be a poor guide for estimating the eﬀects of policy
actions, it is possible to control these eﬀects by going back in time.
Closed-loop dynamic games are appropriate modelling approaches to policy analyses even
if the closed-loop solutions are often computationally intractable. The closed-loop control can
be viewed as an alternative method to economic planning.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 formulates
the discrete-time incentive contracting problem. Section 4 deals with asymmetric risk-averse
behavior. Section 5 presents several qualitative results on adaptive risk management. Section
6 makes distinction between more and less risk-averse leaders /followers. Section 7 improves
the concept of closed-loop dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium by taking into account endogenous
risks exhibited by the players. An analytical characterization of the closed-loop solution path
is provided in this sense. Section 8 concludes and makes suggestions for further research.
22. The Model
We consider a dynamic risk-sharing contract between a leader and a follower. This is
modelled by a discrete-time ﬁnite-horizon environmental game with coupling constraints.
The leader is an environmental authority whose objective is the minimization of the en-
vironmental risks associated with important pollution levels generated by a potential polluter
company. He has to account for the sequential nature of the polluter’s decision strategy in
designing the optimal contract.
Environmental decisions are sequential decisions with diﬀerent degrees of future commit-
ment. These represent an important class of stochastic control problems that arise in many
other ﬁelds of economics.
The speciﬁcity of the economic activity is to superimpose on the initial equilibrium of the
system another one richer in complexity, and thus more instable. The ﬂexibility of the system
is not inﬁnite, and the disequilibrium caused by the deviating behavior of the polluter can
be irreversible after some critical threshold is reached. The stability of the system is thus
compromised, resulting in potentially large losses from coordination. Damages can be partially
or totally irreversible.
In the literature on environmental policy making, two types of pollution are most often
analyzed:
i) punctual pollution, when the polluter is identiﬁed and his monitoring does not generally
cause problems, only maybe from the ﬁnancial point of view (Caussade and Prat 1990);
ii) diﬀuse (or non-point) pollution, when the polluter cannot be identiﬁed, and hence mon-
itored. In this case, it is costly for the authority to evaluate the responsibility of the polluter,
and therefore to negotiate with him (Shortle et al. 1998). Some incentive measures based
on the pollution sources (Wu et al. 1995) or subventions for developing pollution control
equipments can be adopted.
One can distinguish two alternatives for the authority to control pullution:
i) to ﬁx the polluter’s output targets. Players have generally diﬀerent preferences on the out-
comes, this asymmetric behavior inducing conﬂict. However, this impediment can be resolved
by cooperation (the outcome is negotiated);
ii) to impose certain thresholds for the targets, which must not be exceeded by the polluter.
The state variable can thus ﬂoat freely until it will reach the absorbing barrier ﬁxed by the
authority, at which time she intervenes to keep that ﬁxed thereafter.
For further interesting aspects on the analysis of strategic conﬂicts, see Myerson (1997).
Under imperfect information, the ex-ante optimal contract typically exhibits ex-post inef-
ﬁcient outcomes. The authority must be able to renegotiate away the ex-post ineﬃciencies.
In the over-pollution context, the penalty problem is generally transformed into an incentive
constraints problem.
Due to uncertainties and irreversibilities that are inherent in environmental problems, en-
vironmental policy design can involve important problems of timing or stopping (Pindyck
2001).
Externalities do occur. In general, the polluter knows more about expected externalities
than the authority does. There is an intimate link between externalities, uncertainty, private
information and diﬀerent objectives among the players.
The most eﬃcient mechanisms of regulation externalities consist in endogenous ﬁnancial
incentives based on the level of pollution measured in the environment. These have the role to
compensate the risk and to limit the eﬀects of adverse selection. Two cases are of interest:
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produced by the polluter’s actions;
ii) when the polluter’s actions reveal relevant information to the authority.
Incentives are transfer payments that may take the form of penalties, taxes, compensations,
and so on. The incentive transfers generally depend on the information detained by the au-
thority as well as on the polluter’s actions. Transfers are costly. These can be made at each
stage of the game or at the conclusion of the process. This way to deﬁne the incentives permits
to the polluter to concentrate his eﬀorts on the environmental problem, being also adapted to
the control of the eﬀects due to the inherent stochasticity of the process (Cabe and Her-
riges 1992; Xepapadeas 1991, 1992, 1994; Shortle and Dunn 1986; Meran and
Schwalbe 1987; Segerson 1988).
The polluter has the possibility to choose freely his optimal strategy of pollution reduction,
this permiting to realize his objective at a lesser cost. He must measure in a reliable manner
the concentrations of the pollution and to determine the setting and the period of sample the
most appropiate. The disadvantage of this kind of incentive is that when it is applied without
discrimination between several polluters, this will be expensive and implies a responsability
of group, being diﬃcult to manage within the regions where the polluters constitute some
pressure groups. In this case, the authority’s objective is to induce a group-optimal behavior
(Krawczyk 1985; Bystrom and Bromley 1998).
The incentive policy implemented by the authority consists in a dynamic taxation when the
output observed is superior to a ﬁxed limit threshold (we call this negative externality) or to
recompense the polluter when the ﬁxed limit threshold is not exceeded (we call this positive
externality).
When it is not proﬁtable to invest into individual controls, the authority can only observe
the state of the environment. The authority does not need to control continually the polluter.
It may be possible to choose a stochastic monitoring (Roth et al. 1989).T h i si st h ec a s e
when the authority and the polluter interact on a long term, when it is often advantageous to
commit to a long term incentive scheme, specifying all potential payments and taxes for the
polluter as time and events unfold. It relieves the authority.
In real economic applications, it appears that to achieve environmental objectives, a com-
bination of taxes with incentive-compatible regulatory schemes is often necessary. The optimal
policy implemented by the authority is thus determined by the balance of control versus incen-
tive.
The type of game we study is composed of two distinct periods, say [−T1,0] and [1,T 2].
The second playing period corresponds to a renegociation of the contract terms based on the
polluter’s performances during the ﬁrst playing period.
It is possible that after the contract is ﬁnished, the players renegotiate the original contract
looking for mutually beneﬁcial gains. The goal structure of the players may change. Other
potential advantages may thus be exploited. This possibility can modify the dynamic incentive
compatibility constraints and may have positive implications for the equilibrium of the game.
It is useful to point out that negative externalities may cause delay in negotiation (Jehiel and
Moldovanu 1995).
In what follows, we investigate the case where the authority does not intervene in the
selection of the polluter’s targets, but imposes certain thresholds over which the polluter will
be taxed. We only analyze the second contract period [1,T 2] by taking into account the history
of the previous game during the playing period [−T1,0].
The players are indexed by an ordered pair (i,j) ∈ {(1,2),(2,1)},w h e r ei is the player on
4whom attention is focused and j is the opponent. Player 1 is the authority /leader.
The type of model we analyze corresponds to a data generating process which is dynamic,
linear and managed by a system of discrete simultaneous equations.
We make the following basic assumptions:
Assumption 1. The evolution of the environment is modelled by a discrete-time multi-
variate linear stochastic process:















t ,B t,D t) ∈ Rk is the time-varying parameter to be estimated;
ii) x
(1)
t ∈ Rq1 represents the authority’s control variable at period t;
iii) x
(2)
t ∈ Rq2 represents the polluter’s control instrument at time t;
iv) zt ∈ Rr is an exogenous variable observed outside the system under consideration, and
hence not subjected to the control;
v) ut ∈ Rp is an exogenous “white noise” disturbance modelled by a normal random variable
with zero mean-vector and ﬁnite variance-covariance matrix Ψ;
vi) T2 represents the end of the planning horizon.
The magnitude of the output values are important determinants of the environmental policy.
Let ya
t (t =1 ,...,T2) be the output thresholds not to be exceeded (regarded as reference points-
limits) that are ﬁxed by the authority. These are strategic constraints to be satisﬁed by the
polluter during the entire contract period.
Remark 1. There is presumably a natural level of pollution that exists in the absence of
any economic activity. It may also exist situations where the level of pollution in t is added to
the level of pollution already existent in t−1. Pollution can thus accumulate in the environment
suﬃciently to become irreversible.








T2} reﬂecting his preferences on the outcomes.
Since a real time control process is necessarily discrete, this cannot converge with precision
to any target value, but only to a neighborhood of it. When the control process is ﬁnished, the
polluter will only obtain a stochastic neighbouring-optimal trajectory which is expected to be
close to the desired path η.
Taking into account foreseeable movements in y as well as possible economic constraints,











t k<l t < 1,t =1 ,...,T2
where lt is a strategic parameter chosen according to the incentive mechanism implemented by
the authority (for further details, see Section 3).
Typically, the environment is stochastic and non stationary by nature. There is thus a
natural tendency for the polluter to overcome the ﬁxed targets due to unobserved shocks which
escape to his control, and hence to be taxed by the authority.
Remark 2. Consider that two deviations of the system with respect to the polluter’s ﬁxed
targets are comparable in magnitude if and only if their ratio is very close to 1.
Assumption 3. The timing of the control is as follows: At each period t,t h ep l a y e r s
implement their actions x
(i)
t (i =1 ,2), which are a stimulus for the system. A shock ut is
5realized and they observe the output (or impulse response) yt. The uncertainty is reduced only
ex-post, that is, only after the informative output-signal has been received.
The polluter employes this output for a strategic learning (speciﬁc to a closed-loop moni-
toring) in order to drive the system as close as possible to the desired path η.
Assumption 4. The optimality of the instruments x
(i)
t (i =1 ,2) is considered with respect
to a global criterion W
(i)
[1,T2] (supposed twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and
convex) which measures the deviations Ma yt
not. = yt − ya
t (for the authority) and, respectively,
Mp yt
not. = yt − y
g
t (for the polluter).
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with a prime denoting transpose.
The decision for choosing certain parameters Kt,i and dt,i reﬂects the players’ priorities and
also depends on the available amount of information concerning the future development of the
system parameters. At each period t, the parameters Kt,i and dt,i are updated and new optimal
values are chosen in order to satisfy the players’ requirements.
This is the classical context, often employed in t h el i t e r a t u r e ,w h e r eb o t hp l a y e r sa r ec o n s i d -
ered risk-neutral in their preferences during the entire period of the contract. In the following,
we extend this restrictive point of view to the more realistic case where both players exhibit
endogenous risk-averse behavior.
3. Potential Taxes and Recompenses
Optimal contract schemes when the relationship between a regulator (e.g., the authority)
and a private agent (e.g., the polluter) is subject to asymmetric information are now widely
studied in the literature (Laffont and Tirole 1993; Salanie 1997; Laffont and Mar-
timort 2002; Laffont 2003, amongst others).
Private information to the polluter may be used for strategic purposes in the relationship
with the authority. Most of the time, it is assumed that the private-information parameter
is observed /revealed to the polluter when the contract is signed. However, in a number of
practical situations, it may be the case that the polluter does not observe the private-parameter
before engaging in a contract-based relationship with the authority. It comes to consider that
the private information does entail uncertainty.
Simulating the optimal policy of the polluter, the authority can conclude if the equilibrium
obtained corresponds with his regulation policy. If not, the space of the polluter’s strategies
can be restricted through some means of pressure (Krawczyk 1985, 1995).
6In the case where the measures are not in concordance with the expectations of the authority,
it can signify that there exist dynamic externalities, that is, some situations in which the most
prefered outcome is unilateral non-cooperation (the polluter is ordinary selﬁsh maximizer). In
this case, the authority must design structures (or incentive schemes) which harmonize this
tendancy. These are purported to incite the polluter to choose the cooperative instead of a free
rider solution.
Taxes are decisions of the authority which generally depend on the features of the environ-
ment. These are employed to punish the deviating polluter in order to achieve ﬁxed environ-
mental objectives. Using taxes, the authority imposes constraints on the polluter’s behavior.
Because the inputs are not public information (and hence veriﬁable in court), the authority
does not tax directly the polluter’s actions. These are not observable, and thus non contractible
by the authority. Only the outputs (poor performances) are taxed.
The output is considered to be of strategic importance, not being allowed to exceed a speciﬁc
magnitude. The tax level for the period t depends on the observable quantity k yt −ya
t k.O n e
can imagine two distinct scenarios:
i) if yt >y a
t such that k yt − ya
t k > 1, then the polluter is taxed with Pt;
ii) if yt >y a
t such that k yt −ya
t k ≤ ct < 1( w i t hct ≥ lt, a strategic parameter ﬁxed by the
authority), then the polluter is taxed with ctPt.
Note that it may exist discontinuities in the taxation system, in the sense that for distinct
periods of the planning horizon one can have diﬀerent levels of taxation.
The authority can inﬂuence the choice of the polluter’s action by conditioning his utility on
the outcome, and hence oﬀering a recompense which depends on the outcome measures that
have been observed.
The decision cost increases with the incentive levels. The recompense mechanism is given
by the following decision rule:
i) if yt <y a
t such that k yt − ya
t k > 1, then the polluter is granted with St;
ii) if yt ≤ ya
t such that k yt −ya
t k <c 0
t < 1( w i t hc0
t >c t, a strategic parameter ﬁxed by the
authority), then the polluter is granted with c0
tSt.
It may also exist discontinuities in the recompense system, in the sense that for distinct
periods of the planning horizon, one can have diﬀerent levels of recompense.
It is important for the authority to ﬁx higher values for taxes than for recompenses (i.e.,
Pt >S t for t =1 ,...,T2). The strategic parameters ct and c0
t are selected such that ctPt <c 0
tSt
for each period t. The polluter has thus the possibility to fully beneﬁt from recompenses.
We mention here three important strategic objectives of the environmental regulation:
i) to protect the environmental quality (it implies a cost);
ii) eﬃciency (maximizing net beneﬁts);
iii) cost-eﬀectiveness (i.e., less costly method for achieving the goal, and a cost-minimizing
contract).
These criteria are by no means the only possible criteria for judging environmental policies.
They can be wiewed as strategic priorities (or asymmetric rationing criteria) in preserving the
environment and optimizing the authority’s cost function. Note that it will always exist uncer-
tainty over the future potential costs (speciﬁc to environmental damages and their reduction)
and beneﬁts of the policy adopted.
When modelling the polluter’s risk behavior, both potential taxes and recompenses are
taken into account. Taxes increases the polluter’s risk aversion, while recompenses have a
compensation eﬀect.




(pj−1Pj−1 + sj−1Sj−1), with Pj−1 = Pj−1 (or cj−1Pj−1)
and Sj−1 = Sj−1 (or c0
j−1Sj−1), the cumulative taxes and recompenses during the period [t−k,
t−1], where k is an optimal backward lag parameter correlated with the polluter’s risk-averse
type (see Section 4), and pj−1, sj−1 (j = t − (k − 1),...,t) are strategic weights reﬂecting the
importance the polluter places on taxes and recompenses taken individually, and respectively
together.
By deﬁnition:
0 ≤ pt−k ≤ ... ≤ pt−1 ≤ 1; 0 ≤ st−k ≤ ... ≤ st−1 ≤ 1
pt−kPt−k ≥ st−kSt−k,...,pt−1Pt−1 ≥ st−1St−1
pt−kPt−k + st−kSt−k ≤ ... ≤ pt−1Pt−1 + st−1St−1
The absence of cooperation can result in a low performance of the system. In this case, the
authority can choose draconian punishment strategies (Abreu 1988). These are proposed to
punish the polluter to the maximum extent possible.
The contract is reinforced by punishments. The authority learns to optimally punish devi-
ating behavior and the potential deviator learns that he will be punished.
The presence of draconian strategies in the perturbations can restrict the equilibrium pay-
oﬀs. Non-draconian strategies do not generally induce cooperation (Evans and Thomas
2001).
4. Risk Averse Behavior
Although there is an extensive literature on incentive control of hierarchical bilevel planning
models in environmental science (Filar and Carraro 1995; Tidball and Zaccour 2005;
Breton et al. 2008; Dinar et al. 2008, among many others), there is no theoretical
approach for analyzing, comparing, evaluating and predicting the degree of risk-aversion of
asymmetric players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions stated as a Stackelberg
game.
Games with a hierarchical decision-making structure are known as Stackelberg games and
the solution concept used for this type of games is the Stackelberg equilibrium. Note that
non-cooperative games with an additional structure of hierarchical decision-making were ﬁrst
studied by Von H. Stackelberg (1934).
The aim of this section is to introduce the key concept of time-varying endogenous risk
premium in dynamic stochastic environments. Constant absolute risk-aversion is not a tenable
assumption for a majority of environmental models. CARA utility functions cannot capture
the full behavior of the polluter towards risk.
Polluter’s risk aversion is essential in assessing correctly the choice of inputs and their impact
on the environment. Ommiting attitude towards risk may result in incorrect interpretation and
prediction of environment responses. Three distinct deﬁnitions of the polluter’s risk aversion
index are proposed:
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8where:
i) −1 < Lt−1 ≤ Lt−2 ≤ ... ≤ Lt−k < 0 are strategic weights attached to the system deviations





ii) k ≥ 1 is the optimal number of backward periods taken into account for estimating the
risk-aversion index.
iii) l ≥ 1i saﬁxed integer which characterizes the polluter’s type (more or less risk-averse
by nature).
In this context, only a limited history of the process (the most informative for the polluter)
is taken into consideration. The strategic weights are supposed to take smaller values in the
context of a principal-agent relationship compared to the case of a single-player game.




1−k,...} the history of the process and, respectively,
the output targets ﬁxed by the polluter during the ﬁrst playing period [−T1,0].
The set of parameters {L0,...,L1−k,...} represents strategic weights attached to the system
deviations with respect to the polluter’s optimal path for the period [−T1,0].
In the case where the polluter has the interest to use a progressive history of the process,
the following deﬁnition of the risk-aversion index is considered:
Deﬁnition 2.U s i n gt to denote time, the polluter’s risk aversion index evolves according
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where
−1 < Lt−1 ≤ Lt−2 ≤ ... ≤ L0 < 0






This may be the case where the polluter needs more information in improving the risk
assessment process. For further details, see Protopopescu (2007).
Let us now consider the case where the polluter’s targets are ﬁxed by the authority. In this
particular context, the polluter’s risk aversion index is given by the following deﬁnition:
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Due to random shocks which are beyond the polluter’s control, at least one amongst the
deviations k yt−j − y
g
t−j kand k yt−j − yl
t−j k (j =1 ,...,k or j =1 ,...,t) is inherently strictly
positive. The risk-aversion index is thus strictly negative by construction. In other words, the
polluter can be considered risk-averse by nature.
9Depending on the deﬁnition employed, the polluter’s risk behavior and the authority’s
transfers may vary diﬀerently with the system ﬂuctuations. We exemplify this possibility in
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One can distinguish several scenarios:
i) If yt−1 <y
g
t−1 <y a
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t−1 k < k yt−1 − ya





e Lt−1 = Lt−1.
In this case, the polluter is recompensed at time t − 1 and will be less risk-averse at time t
when employing the Deﬁnition 1.H o w e v e r ,i fe Lt−1 < Lt−1, one cannot decide about which of
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In other words, the polluter is taxed at time t − 1 and will be more risk-averse at time t
when employing the Deﬁnition 1.
iii) If y
g
t−1 <y t−1 <y a








t,3, this depending on the
diﬀerence in magnitude between the norm-deviations k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k and k yt−1 − ya
t−1 k.A t
time t − 1, the polluter is recompensed.
In the literature on principal-agent issues, two distinct scenarios are considered when ana-
lyzing the players’ strategic relationship:
i) the case of a risk-neutral principal;
ii) the case of a principal with a ﬁxed risk premium.
In both cases, the assumptions adopted are very restrictive, being convenient only for mod-
elisation purposes. The fact that the principal is the dominant player in the game does not
justify to assume that he is less risk-averse compared to the private agent. Taking into account
the eﬀects of adverse selection and moral hazard, inherent in any principal-agent relationship,
there may exist situations where the principal is more risk-averse compared to the private
agent. One can imagine the extreme case where the agent is risk-neutral and the principal is
risk-averse.
In what follows, two distinct deﬁnitions are proposed for the principal’s /authority’s risk
aversion index:
i) when the most informative actions of the agent /polluter are taken into account;
ii) when a progressive history of the agent’s /polluter’s response-actions is considered in the
analysis.
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where:
10i) −1 < Lt−1 ≤ Lt−2 ≤ ... ≤ L
t−k < 0 are strategic weights attached to the distance between
the players’ actions on the time horizon [t − 1,t− k].
ii) k ≥ 1 is an optimal number of backward periods (the most informative for the authority).






1−k,...}, i =1 ,2, the history of the players’ actions during the ﬁrst
playing period [−T1,0].
The set of parameters {L0,...,L
1−k,...} represents strategic weights attached to the distance
between the players’ actions for the period [−T1,0].
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where −1 < Lt−1 ≤ Lt−2 ≤ ... ≤ L0 < 0 are strategic weights attached to the distance
between the players’ actions on the time horizon [t − 1,0].
The smaller the scalar weight, the higher the importance given by the authority to the
polluter’s deviation from his local objective.
One can imagine several scenarios when comparing the degree of risk-aversion exhibited by
the players:
i) when both authority and polluter have similar coeﬃcients of absolute risk-aversion during




t,j0 | is small, with j ∈ {1,2}, j0 ∈ {1,2,3} and t ∈
{1,...,T2});
ii) when both authority and polluter have the same coeﬃcient of absolute risk-aversion at




t,j0 for j ∈ {1,2}, j0 ∈ {1,2,3},a n dt ∈ {1,...,T2} taking
ﬁxed values);





t,j0 | is high, with j ∈ {1,2}, j0 ∈ {1,2,3} and t ∈ {1,...,T2}).
We point out the local character of the players’ risk aversion. This is deﬁned for a neigh-
borhood of their ﬁxed targets. There thus exist neighborhood eﬀects of the system dynamics
on the players’ risk behavior.
The reality shows that the relationship between players’ reaction to perceived states of
nature and their attitude to risk is complex. In general, risk-aversion makes this reaction
stronger than risk-neutrality.
For the agent /polluter, this is a consequence of the importance he places on the system
states, while for the principal /authority th i sd e p e n d so nt h ei m p o r t a n c eh ep l a c e so nt h e
agent’s /polluter’s actions.
When the players’ optimal actions are diﬀerent in magnitude, the principal /authority is
inevitably risk-averse.
The combination of the asymmetric information with the risk-aversion makes the analysis
diﬃcult. The classical theory of principal-agent predicts that the risk is shared ineﬃciently
between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent.
11When both players are risk-averse by nature, the objective is to optimally share the risk
during the period of contract. This requires an eﬃcient incentive mechanism and a powerful
control strategy to be implemented in order that the agent does not exceed the thresholds set
by the principal.
5. Adaptive Risk Management
In this section, we deal with important qualitative aspects of the players’ risk behavior.
More exactly, it is analyzed the polluter’s risk aversion according to the deviation of the system
from his ﬁxed targets and, respectively, the authority’s risk aversion according to the polluter’s
response-actions. It is also studied the eﬀect of the system ﬂuctuations on the authority’s
incentive policy. In this sense, it is examined the way the variation in outputs inﬂuences the
allocation of taxes and recompenses.
Proposition 1. Small system deviations during the period [t−k,t−1] will annul the eﬀect
of potential taxes and decrease to zero the polluter’s risk aversion at time t.
Proof. In the case where k yt−j−y
g
t−j k → 0 ∀ j =1 ,...,k, ∀ t =1 ,...,T2,w eh a v eϕ
(2)
t,1 → 0,
and hence an almost risk-neutral behavior of the polluter at time t.
One can write the inequality: k yt−j − yl
t−j k<k yt−j − y
g
t−j k<c t−j. The polluter will be





sj−1Sj−1,with Sj−1 = c
0
j−1Sj−1 (j = t − k +1 ,...,t).
Proposition 2. High system deviations during the period [t − k,t − 1] will amplify the
eﬀect of potential taxes and increase the polluter’s risk aversion at time t.
Proof. For ease of exposition, we consider the case where the system deviations k yt−j −
y
g
t−j k are high and comparable in magnitude (k yt−j0 − y
g
t−j0 k / k yt−j00 − y
g
t−j00 k ≈ 1f o r
j0,j00 =1 ,...,k; j0 6= j00). This type of behavior will annul the eﬀect of potential recompenses









Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k
k
In the case of a principal-agent relationship, the strategic weights Lt−j (j =1 ,...,k)a r e
assumed to be smaller compared to those ﬁxed in the case of a single-player game. The value
of the ratio
Lt−1+...+Lt−k
k will be thus smaller in magnitude.
The agent /polluter is hence characterized by a higher risk-aversion in t. In particular, it
may be possible that he becomes excessively risk-averse for the period t.
Consequence 1. In the case where k yt−j − y
g









Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k
k
12In other words, high system deviations with respect to the polluter’s ﬁxed targets signify
that k yt−j − y
g
t−j kÀ 1f o rt =1 ,...,T2 and j =1 ,...,k.




Proof. Suppose that k1 < k2. One can write the inequality:
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k2
k2
>
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k1
k1
In other words, the smaller the number of backward periods, the higher the eﬀect of taxes on
the polluter’s risk behavior when all system deviations are high and comparable in magnitude.
Proposition 3. The polluter’s degree of risk-aversion will be less and less raised when he
controls better and better the system evolution.
Proof. One can write the sequence of inequalities:
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k
k
<








In other words, the polluter will become more and more conﬁdent over time when he manages
better and better the system evolution. The conclusion follows.
For this type of scenario, the potential recompenses have a dominant eﬀect on the potential
taxes.
Proposition 4. The polluter becomes more and more risk-averse over time when he controls
more and more hardly the system evolution.







Lt−1 + ... + Lt−(k−1)
k − 1
<
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k
k
Each above ratio corresponds (in this order) to the polluter’s risk-aversion index at time
t in the case where he controls more and more hardly the system evolution. The conclusion
follows.
For this type of scenario, the potential taxes have a dominant eﬀect on the potential rec-
ompenses.
Proposition 5. If the last system deviation is high and all preceding deviations are close
to zero in magnitude, then the polluter’s risk aversion will be higher compared to the case when
all system deviations are high and comparable.
Proof.S u p p o s et h a tk yt−1−y
g
t−1 k is high and k yt−j −y
g




t,1 → Lt−1 <
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−k
k
A single taxation period can therefore generate a higher risk-aversion compared to the case
of multiple taxation periods. This is an astonishing result, far from intuitive.
Proposition 6. The moment of time when a large deviation of the system is obtained in
the past can change the current risk-aversion degree of the polluter.
13Proof. Consider the case where the system deviation from the ﬁxed target at time t−k is
large but all other deviations are close to zero in magnitude. This is what we call accidental
taxation at time t − k. For this type of scenario, one obtains:
ϕ
(2)
t,1 → Lt−k > ... > Lt−1
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ek<k
0
,w eh a v eLt−k < Lt−k
0, and hence a higher risk-aversion of the
polluter for the same period of the contract. The more the tax is distant in the past, the more
its eﬀect on the polluter’s risk behavior is weaker.
Consider now the case where the system deviation from the ﬁxed target at time t − k is
small but all other deviations are large and comparable in magnitude. This is what we call
accidental recompense at time t − k. One can write the inequality:
Lt−1 + ... + Lt−(k−1)
k − 1
< Lt−k
In other words, the polluter’s risk aversion at time t will be higher for an accidental recom-
pense compared to the case of an accidental taxation at the same period t − k.
Proposition 7. The more the players’ optimal actions are distant during the period [t −
k,t−1], the more the authority is risk-averse at time t. In the case where the players’ optimal





t−j (j =1 ,...,k) are comparable in magnitude, then one obtains
ϕ
(1)
t,1 → 0. In other words, the authority becomes almost risk-neutral at time t. In contrast,
when the players’ optimal actions are distant, the authority’s risk aversion is large.
In the real world, the incentive mechanism implemented by the principal /authority does not
always ensure an optimal risk-sharing during the entire contract period. It may exist situations
where the principal /authority is more risk-averse compared to the private agent /polluter. In
particular, it may be possible for the principal /authority to become excessively risk-averse over
time.
6. Players with Distinct Risk-Aversion Proﬁle
Experimental evidence shows that strategic players overweight extreme events. The ability
to assess future risks associated with extreme events is increasingly important in many strategic
interactions modelled as a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game.
Let ϕ
(2)
min be an optimal risk-aversion threshold ﬁxed by the polluter before starting the
contract and for the entire period [1,T 2]. It characterizes the polluter’s risk-averse type.
The objective is not to exceed this limit threshold. Otherwise, the polluter becomes exces-
sively risk-averse for the current control period.
Note that ϕ
(2)
t,i (i =1 ,2,3) characterize the polluter’s local risk-aversion (at time t), while
ϕ
(2)
min characterizes his global risk-aversion (over the whole period [1,T 2]). For further details,
see Protopopescu (2007).
Proposition 8. In any dynamic principal-agent relationship there exist two types of risk-
averse agents.
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g




(k yt−1 − y
g
t−1 k2 +... + k yt−k − y
g
t−k k2)2 + l
14T h ea g e n t ’ so b j e c t i v ei st oo b t a i nk yt−j − y
g










One can imagine two possible scenarios:
ϕ
(2)
















min, more (more risk-averse agent)
This type of analysis allows us to distinguish between common types of polluters. A total
separation of distinct types of polluters is also possible. We deal with a continuum of polluter’s
types.
Both risk-aversion thresholds ϕ
(2)
min, less and ϕ
(2)
min, more are not exceeded during the period of
the game if and only if the agent /polluter succeeds in controlling the ﬂuctuating system.
By analogy, nothing impedes to consider an optimal risk-aversion threshold for the principal
/authority, say ϕ
(1)
min. This characterizes his risk behavior proﬁle and must not be exceeded
during the entire planning horizon. The fact that the principal /authority imposes the rules of
the game does not necessarily mean that he will be less risk-averse (before and after starting
the game) compared to the private agent /polluter.
Proposition 9. In a dynamic principal-agent relationship there generally exist two types
of risk-averse principals.
Proof. The goal of the principal’s incentive policy is to induce an optimal behavior at
equilibrium, and thus to eliminate sub-optimal outcomes. In other words, the players’ actions





t−j k< 1 ∀ j =1 ,...,k, ∀ t =1 ,...,T2








Two distinct scenarios are possible:
ϕ
(1)
min, less. < −
T2 − 1
q






(T2 − 1)2 + l
<ϕ
(1)
min, more (more risk-averse principal)
15This type of analysis allows us to obtain a diﬀerentiation of common /distinct types of
risk-averse authorities.
Note that an excessive risk-averse behavior of the polluter does not necessarily induce an
imitative behavior of the authority for the same period of the contract.











< 0f o rl ≥ l
In this case, the authority can be considered less risk-averse before starting the contract
compared to the polluter. It may also be possible to have the contrary situation, when l<l.
It is very important to distinguish between “nature” and “type”. Both players are considered
risk-averse by nature. By “type”, one means more or less risk-averse players. The system
evolution reﬁnes the polluter’s type, while the polluter’s response-actions reﬁnes the authority’s
type.
The length of the game can inﬂuence the attitude to risk of the players before starting the
game. Because a closed-loop strategy is employed for a short planning horizon, this implies
a non-negligible risk-aversion level for both players at time t = 0. The shorter the planning
horizon, the higher the players’ degree of risk-aversion before starting the game. In other words,
increased uncertainty leads to a shorter duration of the game. The contract length is thus
decreasing in uncertainty.
This result is in accordance with the classic empirical analysis of contract duration in labor
markets (Wroman 1989; Murphy 1992, amongst others).
7. Stackelberg Strategic Equilibrium Sensitive to Endogenous Risk-Aversion
This type of equilibrium is appropiate and quite attractive for situations where one of the
players is in possession of a suﬃcient quantity of information for being leader (or dominant
player), but many times possibly a poor enough information about his opponent.
Even if the parties are initially symmetrically informed, the follower may later endogenously
acquire some private information. The presence of asymmetry is not only in the information
structure but also in the way the follower aﬀects the decision process.
This brings the impact of the follower’s behavior as an issue of major importance in the
construction of the optimal policy. For this type of situations, the follower adopts a passive
strategy equilibrium, waiting for the leader’s optimal policy to reveal.
The interaction of the leader’s optimal policy with the dynamic learning process of the
follower is a reality which must be fully recognized. At each step of the game, the follower can
choose between cooperative and non-cooperative behavior.
Stackelberg games play an extremely important role in such ﬁelds as economics, manage-
ment, politics and behavioral sciences. This game-theoretical concept is widely used in various
domains such as market sharing, investment allocation, environmental policy, monetary prob-
lems, and so on.
This kind of game may be at the leader’s best payoﬀ or at the follower’s best payoﬀ.T h e
dominant player has the ability to announce his strategy in advance. By doing this, he will
send a signal to the follower, and thus will lose a private strategic information, but the goal is
to dictate the game. A question arises: How this strategic signal will inﬂuence the follower’s
behavior?
16Both players derive individual utilities from their optimal actions. The follower can take
a decision which aﬀects his utility level and also has a direct impact on the leader’s planning
objective. In general, the leader’s preferences tend towards non-stationarity due to possible
changes in the follower’s dynamic behavior.
We consider the case where both players take into account only a limited number of backward
periods when estimating their risk-aversion parameters.
For each t =1 ,...,T2, the players’ risk preferences are described, respectively, by the strictly




































[1,t]) − 1] (for the follower)
The exponential utility functions are the most widely utilized risk-sensitive utility functions
because they can model a spectrum of risk attitudes for the players (Corner and Corner
1995).
By construction, the local objective function U
(i)
t is strictly convex with respect to the
control variable handled by the player i.
In order to avoid drastic changes from one period to the next, some upper and lower bounds






















































the admissible strategies space of the leader for the period t. The follower’s reaction set in t
for a given incentive compatible strategy x
(1)




def. = E(·|It−1) be the operator of conditional expectation, where It−1 represents
the information available up to time t − 1.




































t ) ∩ Λ
(2)
t is called incentive closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
sensitive to the players’ local risk-aversion.
The equilibrium of the game is a random vector whose statistic is not known a priori because
it depends on what strategy the follower will adopt.
In the case of a leader-follower interaction process, the Pareto-optimality principle (Pareto
1909) is not generally valid for the leader’s strate g i e s .T h ee q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m en e e d sn o t
to be Pareto optimal. When the optimality principle is also valid for the leader, he will choose
a strategy situated on the curve of reaction of the follower.
17As opposed to a Nash (1950, 1951) equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium is deﬁned
uniquely in the case of a linear model. In contrast, for a nonlinear speciﬁcation, there may
exist non-unique solutions, and hence it will be diﬃcult for the leader to make decisions. More
exactly, when the leader employes some strategy, there exist diverse decisions for the follower.
Some strategies are beneﬁcial for the leader, while others are not. Therefore, the leader has to
be careful when selecting his strategy.
Note that the dynamic Stackelberg solution is appropriate in nonzero-sum dynamic games
when a hierarchy in decision-making exists. By hierarchy, one means that the players hold
non-symmetrical roles in the decision-making process.
The common feature of the closed-loop solutions is that they are incentive strategies in which
t h el e a d e ri n d u c e st h ef o l l o w e rt ob eo nt h eo p t i m a l solution path. If the follower deviates from
the ex-ante speciﬁed path for some reason, then the leader can induce him to return to this
after one period (Basar and Selbuz 1979; Basar and Olsder 1980).
The leader knows that the follower will maximize his utility function at time t with respect
to his optimal strategy s
g(1)
t to obtain the best response-function s
g(2)
t . This type of information
will be included in his expected utility function for the next period, before maximizing with
respect to his control variable. Because the leader is not sure about the strategy the follower
will play, his behavior will be uncertain. However, he can compute (ex-ante) up to a random
shock the eﬀe c t so ft h ef o l l o w e r ’ sp o l i c yc h a n g e so nh i so ptimal rule. It is precisely in this sense
that one can say that the leader’s strategy depends upon his beliefs.
As u b s t a n t i a le ﬀort has been devoted in the literature to various incentive Stackelberg solu-
tion concepts. However, most of the incentive strategies developed include either the follower’s
control, which may not be realistic in practice, or time-varying delays in the state variable,
which makes the stabilization process more diﬃcult to achieve.
Denote by s
(2)
t,e the agent’s strategy expected by the leader at time t. By taking into account
the projected rational response of the follower, the leader seeks that policy which leads to a
most favorable outcome for him.
If the leader will announce a strategy s
g(1)
t , by solving the maximization programme:
s
g(1)



























t,e + Btzt + Dt + ut
y0,y t > 0,t =1 ,...,T2 (economic constraints)
then the follower will compute his optimal policy as if the environment would be modelled
by:








t + Btzt + Dt + ut,t =1 ,...,T2



































t + Btzt + Dt + ut
y0,y t > 0,t =1 ,...,T2 (economic constraints)
Each player takes the reactions of the opponent at least partially into account. In this type
of relationship, the follower faces a double uncertainty:
18i) about the action that the leader takes; and ii) about the action taken by himself.
The unsignalled information of the follower is probabilistically dependent on the unsignalled
information of the leader.
When modelling the leader-follower relationships as a dynamic game, the optimization prob-
lem is naturally interactive. If the decision rule of the leader changes, the behavior of the
follower will also change. It may be possible to exist policy shifts caused by adverse selection
and imperfect information.
T h el e a d e rm u s tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ee ﬀect of his policy rules on the follower’s actions.
His decisions can be interpreted as signals sent to reveal the reactions of the follower. It
generally exists a discrete tˆ atonnement process from the part of the leader. The information
revealed by the follower’s actions may be relevant to the leader’s future decisions. The follower
can transmit involuntarily (by his actions) a part of his private information to the leader.
Moreover, he creates (by his actions) informational externalities which induce new information
structure and new behavior.
Outside behavior can eﬀect the equilibrium agreements. The follower may be able to gain
more in average expected utility (conditional on his information up to that date) by deviating
from the game equilibrium strategy. In this case, the leader will modify his strategy in order
to discourage the follower from taking advantage from this situation. The follower is free to
reject the contract without sharing risk with the leader.
The leader’s ability to exploit the anticipative eﬀects of his policy depends critically on
the one-period delay inherent to the discrete-time modelling of the state variable. The timing
eﬀect plays an important role in this case. The solution which is optimal for the leader at
the beginning of the game is thus time-inconsistent. It ceases to be optimal for the leader
in subsequent periods (Simaan and Cruz 1973; Kydland 1975, 1977; Kydland and
Prescott 1977; Miller and Salmon 1985).
The leader has thus an incentive to restart the game. Such a succession of restarted leader-
follower solutions would be unsustainable and hence unappealing as a solution concept. The
time inconsistency may arise because the follower takes certain actions before the leader chooses
the optimal path of instruments. More exactly, the follower takes his decisions based on expec-
tations of the leader’s policy while the leader takes his decisions based on given expectations
of the follower. This leads to an informational advantage for the leader (Cohen and Michel
1988).
Anticipative control is the leader’s ability to indirectly inﬂuence the evolution of the state
vector backwards in time by accounting for the follower’s current reactions to change in his
current and expected future control settings. It is this eﬀect which causes dynamic Stackelberg
equilibria to be time-inconsistent (Basar and Olsder 1995).
Note that generally one cannot say how much information is actually transmitted from the
informed to the uninformed party in equilibrium. There may be equilibria in which all the
relevant information is transmitted as well as equilibria in which no relevant information is
transmitted.
We are now in a position to derive the closed-loop Stackelberg equilibrium sensitive to
endogenous risk-aversion of the players.















t a r ei n v e r s i b l ef o re a c ht =1 ,...,T2 and i =1 ,2.
Under the hypotheses stated in Section 2, the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game is described
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t,e + Btzt + Dt + ut










































































not. = yt − y
a
t,H t,1
def. = Kt,1,h t,1
not. = Kt,1y
a
t − dt,1,f t,1
not. = y
a0
t (ht,1 − dt,1)








t,e + Btzt + Dt + ut for yt,o n eo b t a i n s :
V
(1)
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2 expω3 (e ut)de ut








t,1Ht,1)(e ut − ut)+i n d e pe n d e n to fe ut
It follows that:

















































t,e + Btzt + Dt) − ht,1]
Thus, the integral becomes:
I
(1)






































t,1Ht,1)(e ut − ut))de ut
21The last integral is equal to 1 because the integrand is the probability density function of a
p-dimensional normal random variable:





with −1 power denoting inverse.
If we replace ut by its value, we ﬁnd without diﬃculty:
I
(1)








t ,z t,β t,K t,1,d t,1,y
a
t)
where Ip denotes the p × p identity matrix.
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not. = Ψ−1 + ϕ
(1)
t,1Ht,1











































































































































































Let us now analyze the stochastic optimization programme for the follower. At each period
t, the reaction strategy of the follower is described by the asymmetric information problem:
s
g(2)



























t + Btzt + Dt + ut
y0,y t > 0,t =1 ,...,T2 (economic constraints)
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It is important to note that the strategies adopted depend on the players’ types. The
present approach improves the traditional solution concept of Stackelberg strategy with feed-
back /closed-loop information structure for discrete-time linear-quadratic games in the case
when the players exhibit endogenous risk (Chen and Cruz Jr., 1972; Simaan and Cruz
Jr. 1973a, 1973b; Gardner Jr. and Cruz Jr., 1977; Medanic 1978; Basar and
Selbuz 1979; Tolwinski 1981; Jibbe et al., 1984; Zadrozny 1988; Ambler and
Paquet 1997; Li et al. 2002; Chen and Zadrozny 2002; Jungers et al. 2006; Nie
et al., 2008, amongst others).
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the risk-sharing contract between a leader and a follower is studied in the case
of a discrete-time ﬁnite-horizon environmental game with coupling constraints. The proposed
approach is appropriate for a wide class of economic problems related to incentive Stackel-
berg games with closed-loop information structure and endogenously risk-averse players. The
traditional hypothesis of a risk-neutral leader is a potential borderline case in the present frame-
work. This possibility must be envisaged with prudence when considering dynamic strategic
interactions in highly ﬂuctuating environments. The study allows to diﬀerentiate between the
players’ risk proﬁles and shows that there exist situations where the leader is more risk-averse
compared to the follower. The eﬀects of potential taxes and recompenses on the follower’s
risk behavior are explored. Several realistic scenarios revealing the potential dominant eﬀect of
taxes on recompenses, and vice versa, are proposed in this direction. Taxes generally amplify
the follower’s degree of risk-aversion, while recompenses have a compensation eﬀect. A good
topic for further research is to develop a behavioural game-theoretic approach which exam-
ines the government-private sector relationship from this new perspective. The gouvernment
23is the natural leader (it has the power to tax or to grant behavior) while the private sector
is the natural follower that optimizes its stochastic objective function for given governmental
decisions. For this type of relationship, the private sector’s ability plays an important role in
making rational expectations about the government decisions. The case where governmental
free-riding exists is another interesting topic of research that is worth exploring. We leave this
challenge to future studies.
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